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1 Introduction
There has been an explosion in the number of models proposed for understand-
ing and interpreting the dynamics of financial markets. Broadly speaking, all
such models can be classified into two categories: (a) models which charac-
terize the macroscopic dynamics of financial prices using time-series methods,
and (b) models which mimic the microscopic behavior of the trader population
in order to capture the general macroscopic behavior of prices. Recently, many
econophysicists have trended towards the latter by using multi-agent models
of trader populations. One particularly popular example is the so-called Mi-
nority Game [1], a conceptually simple multi-player game which can show
non-trivial behavior reminiscent of real markets. Subsequent work has shown
that – at least in principle – it is possible to train such multi-agent games
on real market data in order to make useful predictions [2, 3, 4, 5]. However,
anyone attempting to model a financial market using such multi-agent trader
games, with the objective of then using the model to make predictions of real
financial time-series, faces two problems: (a) How to choose an appropriate
multi-agent model? (b) How to infer the level of heterogeneity within the
associated multi-agent population?
This paper addresses the question of how to infer the multi-trader het-
erogeneity in a market (i.e. question (b)) assuming that the Minority Game,
or one of its many generalizations [2, 3], forms the underlying multi-trader
model. We consider the specific case where each agent possesses a pair of
strategies and chooses the best-performing one at each timestep. Our focus is
on the uncertainty for our parameter estimates. Using real financial data for
quantifying this uncertainty, represents a crucial step in developing associated
risk measures, and for being able to identify pockets of predictability in the
price-series.
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As such, this paper represents an extension of our preliminary study in [6].
In particular, the present analysis represents an important advance in that it
generalizes the use of probabilities for describing the agents’ heterogeneity.
Rather than using a probability, we now use a finite measure, which is not
necessarily normalized to unit total weight. This generalization yields a num-
ber of benefits such as a stronger preservation of positive definiteness in the
covariance matrix for the estimates. In addition, the use of such a measure
removes the necessity to scale the time-series, thereby reducing possible fur-
ther errors. We also look into the problem of estimating the finite measure
over a space of agents which is so large that the estimation technique becomes
computationally infeasible. We propose a mechanism for making this problem
more tractable, by employing many runs with small subsets chosen from the
full space of agents. The final tool we present here is a method for removing
bias from the estimates. As a result of choosing subsets of the full agent space,
an individual run can exhibit a bias in its predictions. In order to estimate
and remove this bias, we propose a technique that has been widely used with
Kalman Filtering in other application domains.
2 The Multi-Agent Market Model
Many multi-agent models – such as the Minority Game [1] and its generaliza-
tions [2, 3] – are based on binary decisions. Agents compete with each other for
a limited resource (e.g. a good price) by taking a binary action at each time-
step, in response to global price information which is publicly available. At
the end of each time-step, one of the actions is denoted as the winning action.
This winning action then becomes part of the information set for the future.
As an illustration of the tracking scheme, we will use the Minority Game –
however we encourage the reader to choose their own preferred multi-agent
game. The game need not be a binary-decision game, but for the purposes of
demonstration we will assume that it is.
2.1 Parameterizing the Game
We provide one possible way of parameterizing the game in order to fit the
proposed methodology. We select a time horizon window of length T over
which we score strategies for each agent. This is a sliding window given by
(wk−T , . . . , wk−1) at time step k. Here wk = -sgn(zk) represents what would
have been the winning decision at time k, and zk is the difference in the
corresponding price-series, or exchange-rate, rk.
zk = rk − rk−1 (1)
Each agent has a set of strategies which it scores on this sliding time-horizon
window at each time-step. The agent chooses its highest scoring strategy as its
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winning strategy, and then plays it. Assume we have N such agents. At each
time-step they each play their winning strategy, resulting in a global outcome
for the game at that time-step. Their aggregate actions result in an outcome
which we expect to be indicative of the next price-movement in the real price-
series. If one knew the population of strategies in use, then one could predict
the future price-series with certainty – apart from a few occasions where ties
in strategies might be broken randomly.
The next step is to estimate the heterogeneity of the agent population
itself. We choose to use a recursive optimization scheme similar to a Kalman
Filter – however we will also force inequality constraints on the estimates so
that we cannot have a negative number of agents of a given type playing the
game. Suppose xk is the vector at time-step k representing the heterogeneity
among the N types of agents in terms of their strategies. We can write this
as
xk =


x1,k
...
xN,k

 (2)
where we force each element of the vector to be ≥ 0.
xi,k ≥ 0, ∀i (3)
We provided a very similar scheme recently in [6], in which we had further
constrained our estimate to a probability space and as a result also had to
re-scale the time-series to better span the interval [−1, 1]. We now relax the
constraint condition (and the re-scaling) since the benefits of lying within the
probability space are outweighed by the benefits of allowing the estimate to
move out of this space. One significant benefit of staying within the proba-
bility space is the ability to bound covariance matrices on errors (since upper
bounds on the probability of certain events are known). On the other hand,
staying constrained to a probability space removes one degree of freedom from
our system (i.e. xN,k = 1−x1,k− · · ·−xn−1,k). This can cause the covariance
of our estimate to become ill-formed by a possible numerical loss of posi-
tive definiteness (which we could prevent by artificially inflating the diagonal
elements of the covariance matrix).
3 Recursive Optimization Scheme
In the following subsections we introduce the Kalman Filter, after which we
will discuss some desirable extensions for our work.
3.1 Kalman Filter
A Kalman Filter is a recursive least-squares implementation, which makes
only one pass through the data such that it can wait for each measurement
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to come in real time, and then make an estimate for that time given all the
information from the past. The Kalman Filter holds a minimal amount of
information in its memory at each time, yielding a relatively cheap compu-
tational cost for solving the optimization problem. In addition, the Kalman
Filter can make a forecast n steps ahead and provides a covariance structure
concerning this forecast. The Kalman Filter is a predictor-corrector system,
that is to say, it makes a prediction and upon observation of real data, it
perturbs the prediction slightly as a correction, and so forth.
The Kalman Filter attempts to find the best estimate at every iteration,
for a system governed by the following model:
xk = Fk,k−1xk−1 + uk,k−1, uk,k−1 ∼ N(0, Qk,k−1) (4)
zk = Hkxk + vk, vk ∼ N(0, Rk) (5)
Here xk represents the true state of the underlying system, which in our case
is the finite measure over the agents. Fk,k−1 is a matrix used to make the
transition from state xk−1 to xk. In our applications, we choose Fk,k−1 to be
the identity matrix for all k since we assume that locally the finite measure
over the strategies doesn’t change drastically. It would be a tough modeling
problem to choose another matrix (i.e., not the identity matrix) – however, if
desired we could incorporate a more complex transition matrix into the model,
even one that is dependent on previous outcomes. The variable zk represents
the measurement (also called observation). Hk is a matrix that relates the
state space and measurement space by transforming a vector in the state
space to the appropriate vector in the measurement space. For our artificial
market model, Hk will be a row vector containing the decisions based on each
of the agent’s winning strategies. So xk, the measure over the agents, acts as
a weighting on the decisions for each agent, and the inner product Hkxk can
be thought of as a weighted average of the agents’ decisions – this represents
the aggregate decision made by the system of agents. The variables uk,k−1
and vk are both noise terms which are normally distributed with mean 0 and
variances Qk,k−1 and Rk, respectively.
The Kalman Filter will at every iteration make a prediction for xk, which
we denote by xˆk|k−1. We use the notation k|k − 1 since we will only use
measurements provided until time-step k − 1 in order to make the prediction
at time k. We can define the state prediction error x˜k|k−1 as the difference
between the true state and the state prediction.
x˜k|k−1 = xk − xˆk|k−1 (6)
In addition, the Kalman Filter will provide a state estimate for xk, given all
the measurements provided up to and including time step k. We denote these
estimates by xˆk|k. We can similarly define the state estimate error by
x˜k|k = xk − xˆk|k (7)
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Since we assume uk,k−1 is normally distributed with mean 0, we make the
state prediction simply by using Fk,k−1 to make the transition. This is given
by
xˆk|k−1 = Fk,k−1xˆk−1|k−1 (8)
We can also calculate the associated covariance for the state prediction, which
we call the covariance prediction. This is actually just the expectation of the
outer product of the state prediction error with itself. This is given by
Pk|k−1 = Fk,k−1Pk−1|k−1F
′
k,k−1 +Qk,k−1 (9)
Notice that we use the prime notation on a matrix throughout this paper to
denote the transpose. Now we can make a prediction on what we expect to
see for our measurement, which we call the measurement prediction, by
zˆk|k−1 = Hkxˆk|k−1 (10)
The difference between our true measurement and our measurement prediction
is called the measurement residual, which we calculate by
νk = zk − zˆk|k−1 (11)
We can also calculate the associated covariance for the measurement residual,
which we call the measurement residual covariance, by
Sk = HkPk|k−1H
′
k +Rk (12)
We now calculate the Kalman Gain, which lies at the heart of the Kalman
Filter. This essentially tells us how much we prefer our new observed mea-
surement over our state prediction. We calculate this by
Kk = Pk|k−1H
′
kS
−1
k (13)
Using the Kalman Gain and measurement residual, we update the state esti-
mate. If we look carefully at the following equation, we are essentially taking a
weighted sum of our state prediction with the Kalman Gain multiplied by the
measurement residual. So the Kalman Gain is telling us how much to ‘weight
in’ information contained in the new measurement. We calculate the updated
state estimate by
xˆk|k = xˆk|k−1 +Kkνk (14)
Finally, we calculate the updated covariance estimate. This is just the
expectation of the outer product of the state error estimate with itself. Here
we will give the most numerically stable form of this equation, as this form
prevents loss of symmetry and best preserves positive definiteness
Pk|k = (I −KkHk)Pk|k−1(I −KkHk)
′ +KkRkK
T
k (15)
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The covariance matrices throughout the Kalman Filter give us a way to mea-
sure the uncertainty of our state prediction, state estimate, and the measure-
ment residual. Also notice that the Kalman Filter is recursive, and we require
an initial estimate xˆ0|0 and associated covariance matrix P0|0. Here we simply
provide the equations of the Kalman Filter without derivation. For a detailed
description of the Kalman Filter, see Ref. [7].
3.2 Nonlinear Equality Constraints
As we are estimating a vector in which each element has a non-negative value,
we would like to force the Kalman Filter to have some inequality constraints.
We now introduce a generalization for nonlinear equality constraints followed
by an extension to inequality constraints. In particular, let’s add to our model
(Eqs. (4) and (5)) the following smooth nonlinear equality constraints
ek(xk) = 0 (16)
The constraints provided in Eq. (3) are actually linear. We present the non-
linear case for further completeness here. We now rephrase the problem we
would like to solve, using the superscript c to denote constrained. We are
given the last prediction and its covariance, the current measurement and its
covariance, and a set of equality constraints and would like to make the cur-
rent prediction and find its covariance matrix. Let’s write the problem we are
solving as
zck = h
c
k(xk) + v
c
k, v
c
k ∼ N(0, R
c
k) (17)
Here zck, h
c
k, and v
c
k are all vectors, each having three distinct parts. The
first part will represent the prediction for the current time step, the second
part is the measurement, and the third part is the equality constraint. zck
effectively still represents the measurement, with the prediction treated as a
“pseudo-measurement” with its associated covariance.
zck =

Fk,k−1xˆk−1|k−1zk
0

 (18)
The matrix hck takes our state into the measurement space as before
hck(xk) =

 xkHkxk
ek(xk)

 (19)
Notice that by combining Eqs. (6) and (7), we can rewrite the state error
prediction as
x˜k|k−1 = Fk,k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + uk,k−1 (20)
We can define vck again as the noise term using Eq. (20).
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vck =

−Fk,k−1x˜k−1|k−1 − uk,k−1vk
0

 (21)
vck will be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance R
c
k. The diagonal
elements of Rck represent the variance of each element of v
c
k. We define the
covariance of the state estimate error at time-step k as Pk|k. Notice also that
Rck contains no off-diagonal elements.
Rck =

Fk,k−1Pk−1|k−1Fk,k−1
′ +Qk,k−1 0 0
0 Rk 0
0 0 0

 (22)
This method of expressing our problem can be thought of as a fusion of (a)
the state prediction, and (b) the new measurement at each iteration, under
the given equality constraints. As we did for the Kalman Filter, we will state
the equations here. The interested reader is referred to Refs. [8, 9].
xˆk|k,j =
[
0 I
] [ Rck Hck,j
Hck,j
′ 0
]+ [
zck − h
c
k(xˆ
c
k|k,j−1) +H
c
k,j xˆ
c
k|k,j−1
0
]
(23)
Throughout this paper, we use the + notation on a matrix to denote the
pseudo-inverse. In this method we are iterating over a dummy variable j
within each time-step, until we fall within a predetermined convergence bound∣∣xˆk|k,j − xˆk|k,j−1∣∣ ≤ ck or hit a chosen number of maximum iterations. We
initialize our first iteration as xˆk|k,0 = xˆk−1|k−1 and use the final itera-
tion as xˆk|k = xˆk|k,J where J represents the final iteration. Notice that
we allowed the equality constraints to be nonlinear. As a result, we define
Hck,j =
∂hc
k
∂xk
(xˆk|k,j−1) which gives us a local approximation to the direction of
hck.
A stronger form of these equations can be found in Refs. [8, 9], where Rck
will reflect the tightening of the covariance for the state prediction based on
the new estimate at each iteration of j. We do not use this form and tighten
the covariance matrix within these iterations since in the next section we will
require the flexibility of changing the number of equality constraints between
iterations of j. By not tightening the covariance matrix in this way, we are
left with a larger covariance matrix for the estimate (which shouldn’t harm
us significantly). This covariance matrix is calculated as
Pk|k,j = −
[
0 I
] [ Rck Hck,j
Hck,j
′ 0
]+ [
0
I
]
(24)
Notice that for faster computation times, we need only calculate Pk|k,j for the
final iteration of j. Further, if our equality constraints are in fact independent
of j, we only need to calculate Hck,j once for each k. This also implies that
the pseudo-inverse in Eq. (23) can be calculated only once for each k.
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This method, while very different from the Kalman Filter presented earlier,
provides us with an estimate xˆk|k and a covariance matrix for the estimate
Pk|k at each time-step, in a similar way to the Kalman Filter. However, this
method allows us to incorporate equality constraints.
3.3 Nonlinear Inequality Constraints
We will now extend the equality constrained problem to an inequality con-
strained problem. To our system given by equations (4), (5), and (16), we will
add the smooth inequality constraints given by
lk(xk) ≥ 0. (25)
Our method will be to keep a subset of the inequality constraints active at
any time. An active constraint is simply a constraint that we treat as an
equality constraint. We will ignore any inactive constraint when solving our
optimization problem. After solving the problem, we then check if our solution
lies in the space given by the inequality constraints. If it doesn’t, we start from
the solution in our previous iteration and move in the direction of the new
solution until we hit a set of constraints. For the next iteration, this set of
constraints will be the new active constraints.
We formulate the problem in the same way as before, keeping Eqs. (17),
(18), (21), and (22) the same to set up the problem. However, we replace Eq.
(19) by
hck(xk) =


xk
Hkxk
ek(xk)
lak,j(xk)

 (26)
lak,j represents the set of active inequality constraints. Although we keep Eqs.
(18), (21), and (22) the same, these will need to be padded by additional zeros
appropriately to match the size of lak,j . Now we solve the equality constrained
problem consisting of the equality constraints and the active inequality con-
straints (which we treat as equality constraints) using Eqs. (23) and (24).
Let’s now call the solution from Eq. (23) xˆ∗
k|k,j since we have not yet checked
if this solution lies in the inequality constrained space. In order to check this,
we find the vector that we moved along to reach xˆ∗
k|k,j . This is simply
d = xˆ∗k|k,j − xˆk|k,j−1 (27)
We now iterate through each of our inequality constraints, to check if they
are satisfied. If they are all satisfied, we choose tmax = 1. If they are not, we
choose the largest value of tmax such that xˆk|k,j−1+tmaxd lies in the inequality
constrained space. We choose our estimate to be
xˆk|k,j = xˆk|k,j−1 + tmaxd (28)
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We also would like to remember the inequality constraints which are being
touched in this new solution. These constraints will now become active for the
next iteration and lie in lak,j+1. Note that l
a
k,0 = l
a
k−1,J , where J represents the
final iteration of a given time-step. We do not perturb the error covariance
matrix from Eq. (24) in any way. Under the assumption that our model is a
well-matched model for the data, enforcing inequality constraints (as dictated
by the model) should only make our estimate better. Having a slightly larger
covariance matrix is better than having an overly optimistic one based on a
bad choice for the perturbation [10]. In the future, we will investigate how to
perturb this covariance matrix correctly.
In our application, our constraints are only to keep each element of our
measure positive. Hence we have no equality constraints – only inequality con-
straints. However, we needed to provide the framework to work with equality
constraints before we could make the extension to inequality constraints.
Figure 1 provides a schematic diagram showing how this optimization
scheme fits into the multi-agent game for making predictions.
3.4 Noise Estimation
In many applications of Kalman Filtering, the process noise Qk,k−1 and mea-
surement noise Rk are known. However, in our application we are not provided
with this information a priori so we would like to estimate it. This can often be
difficult to approximate, especially when there is a known model mismatch.
We will present one possible method here which matches the process noise
and measurement noise to the past measurement residual process [11]. We
estimate Rk by taking a window of size Wk (which is picked in advance for
statistical smoothing) and time-averaging the measurement noise covariance
based on the measurement residual process and the past states. If we refer
back to Eq. (12), we can simply calculate this by
Rˆk =
1
Wk − 1
k−1∑
j=k−Wk
νjνj
′ −HjPj|j−1H
′
j (29)
We can now use our choice of Rk along with our measurement residual co-
variance Sk, to estimate Qk,k−1. Combining Eqs. (9) and (12) we have
Sk = Hk(Fk,k−1Pk−1|k−1Fk,k−1
′ +Qk,k−1)Hk
′ +Rk (30)
Bringing all Qk,k−1 terms to one side leaves us with
HkQk,k−1Hk
′ = Sk −HkFkPk−1|k−1Fk
′Hk
′ −Rk (31)
Solving for Qk,k−1 gives us
Qˆk,k−1 =
(
Hk
′Hk
)+
Hk
′
(
Sk −HkFkPk−1|k−1Fk
′Hk
′ −Rk
)
Hk
(
Hk
′Hk
)+
(32)
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Fig. 1. Summary of the recursive method for predicting the heterogeneity of the
multi-agent population. We have dropped theˆnotation. Shown is a situation with 5
types of agents, where each type has more than one strategy. They each score their
strategies over the sliding time-horizon window (wk−T · · ·wk−i) and choose the best
one. Hk represents the decisions they each make in this time-step, which in the
case of a binary-decision game is +1 or -1. Taking the dot product of the frequencies
over the agents and their decisions, we arrive at our prediction for the measurement.
We then allow the recursion into the optimization technique. Since we chose Fk,k−1
as the identity matrix for all k, we omitted it entirely from this diagram. We also
assume initial conditions are provided. In the next subsection, we describe how we
arrive at the noise parameters Qk,k−1 and Rk, which appear in the diagram.
Note that it may be desirable to keep Qˆk,k−1 diagonal if we do not believe
the process noise has any cross-correlation. It is rare that one would expect
a cross-correlation in the process noise. In addition, keeping the process noise
diagonal has the effect of making our covariance matrix ‘more positive def-
inite’. This can be done simply by setting the off-diagonal terms of Qˆk,k−1
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equal to 0. It is also important to keep in mind that we are estimating covari-
ance matrices here which must be symmetric and positive semidefinite, and
the diagonal elements should always be greater than or equal to zero since
these are variances.
4 Estimation in the Presence of an Ecology of Many
Agent Types
It is very likely that we will come across multi-agent markets, and hence mod-
els, with many different agent types, e.g., N > 100. As N grows, not only does
our state space grow linearly, but our covariance space will grow quadratically.
We quickly reach areas where we may no longer be in a computationally feasi-
ble region. For example, if we look at strategies for agents playing the Minority
Game and define a type of agent to have exactly 2 strategies, we see that as
we increase the memory sizes of our agents our full set of pairs of strategies
grows very quickly in relation to the memory size (e.g., m = 1 yields 22
1
= 4
strategies and
(
4
2
)
= 6 pairs of strategies, m = 2 yields 22
2
= 16 strategies
and
(
16
2
)
= 120 pairs of strategies, m = 3 yields 22
3
= 256 strategies and(
256
2
)
= 32640 pairs of strategies, m = 4 yields 22
4
= 65536 strategies and(
65536
2
)
= 2147450880 pairs of strategies, . . . ). If we were interested in simul-
taneously allowing all possible pairs of strategies, our vectors and matrices for
these computations would have a dimension that would not be of reasonable
complexity, especially in situations where real-time computations are needed.
In such situations, we propose selecting a subset of the full set of strategies
uniformly at random, and choosing these as the only set that could be in play
for the time-series. We can then do this a number of times and average over
the predictions and their covariances. We would hope that this would cause a
smoothing of the predictions and remove outlier points. In addition we might
notice certain periods that are generally more predictable by doing this, which
we call pockets of predictability.
4.1 Averaging over Multiple Runs
For each run j of our M runs, we have our predicted measurement at time
k given by zˆk,j and our predicted covariance for the measurement residual as
Sk,j . Using the predicted measurements, we can simply average to find our
best estimate of the prediction.
zˆ∗k =
M∑
j=1
zˆk,j
M
(33)
Similarly, we can calculate our best estimate of the predicted covariance for
the measurement residual:
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S∗k =
M∑
j=1
Sk,j
M
(34)
It is important to note here that since zˆ∗k and S
∗
k are both estimators, asM
tends to∞, we expect the standard error of the mean for both to tend towards
0. Also, note that we chose equal weights when calculating the averages; we
could have alternatively chosen to use non-equal weights had we developed a
system for deciding on the weights.
4.2 Bias Estimation
Since we are choosing subsets of the full strategy space, we expect that in
some runs a number of the strategies might tend to behave in the same way.
This doesn’t mean that the run is useless and provides no information. In
fact, it could be the case that the run provides much information – it is just
that the predictions always tend to be biased in one direction or the other.
So what we might like to do is remove bias from the system. The simplest
way to do this is to augment the Kalman Filter’s state space with a vector
of elements representing possible bias [12]. We can model this bias as lying in
the state space, the measurement space, or some combination of elements of
either or both. We redefine the model for our problem as
xbk = F
b
k,k−1x
b
k−1 + uk,k−1, uk,k−1 ∼ N(0, Q
b
k,k−1) (35)
zk = H
b
kx
b
k + vk, vk ∼ N(0, Rk) (36)
where xbk represents the augmented state and bk is the bias vector at time
step k
xbk =
[
xk
bk
]
(37)
The transition matrix must also be augmented to match the augmented state.
In the top left corner, we place our original transition matrix, and in the top
right corner we place Bk,k−1 representing how the estimated bias term should
be added into the dynamics. In the bottom left we have the zero matrix so
the bias term is not dependent on the state xk, and in the bottom right we
have the identity matrix indicating that the bias is updated by itself exactly
at each time.
F bk,k−1 =
[
Fk,k−1 Bk,k−1
0 I
]
(38)
Similarly, we horizontally augment our measurement matrix, where Ck repre-
sents how the bias terms should be added into the measurement space.
Hbk =
[
Hk Ck
]
(39)
For the process noise, we keep the off diagonal elements as 0, assuming no
cross-correlations between the state and the bias. We also generally assume
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no noise in the bias term and keep its noise covariance as 0, as well. Of course,
this can be changed easily enough if the reader would like to model the bias
with some noise.
Qbk,k−1 =
[
Qk,k−1 0
0 0
]
(40)
We can take this bias model framework and place it into the inequality con-
strained filtering scheme provided earlier, with the model given by Eq. (17),
where we simply use the augmented states when necessary, rather than the
regular state space (e.g. let xk = x
b
k).
5 Example for a Foreign-Exchange Rate Series
We now apply these ideas to a data set of hourly USD/YEN foreign exchange
rate data, from 1993 to 1994, using the Minority Game. We do not claim
that this is a good model for the time-series, but it does contain some of the
characteristics we might expect to see in this time-series. We look at all pairs
of strategies with memory size m = 4 of which there are 2,147,450,880 as our
set of possible types for agents. Since the size of this computation would not
be tractable, we take a random subset of 5 of these types and use these 5 as
the only possible types of agents to play the game. We perform 100 such runs,
each time choosing 5 types at random. In addition, we allow for a single bias
removal term. We could have many more terms for the bias, but we only use 1
in order to limit the growth of the state space. We assume the entire bias lies
in a shifting of the measurements, so we don’t use a Bk,k−1 from Eq. (38) and
only choose Ck in Eq. (39) to be the identity matrix – or in our case simply
1 since Ck is 1x1.
For the analysis of how well our forecasts perform, we calculate the residual
log returns and plot these. Given our time-series, we can calculate the log
return of the exchange rate as lk = log(rk) − log(rk−1). Note that based
on our definition for zk from Eq. (1), we can write the log return also as
lk = log(rk−1+zk)− log(rk−1). Similarly, we can define our predicted forecast
for the log return as lˆk = log(rk−1+zˆk)−log(rk−1). Given these two quantities,
we can calculate the residual of the predicted log return and the observed log
return as l˜k = lk − lˆk. Using the delta method [13], we can also calculate
the variance of this residual to be Sk(rk−1)2 . We perform 100 such runs, which
we average over using the method described in Section 4.1. A good test for
whether our variances are overly optimistic is to check if the measure satisfies
the Chebyshev Inequality. For example, we can check visually that no more
than about 19 of the residuals lie within 3σ’s. We plot the residual log return
along with 3σ bounds and the standard error of the mean in Figure 2. Visually,
we would say the residuals in Figure 2 would certainly satisfy this condition if
they were centered about 0. Maybe further bias removal would readily achieve
this.
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Fig. 2. We show the residuals of the log returns plotted with 3σ’s centered about
0 and the standard error of the mean over the 100 runs. Despite the one parameter
bias removal, we still see a general bias in the data without which the residuals look
much cleaner. Perhaps a more complex bias model would remove this.
6 Conclusion
This paper has looked at how one can infer the multi-trader heterogeneity in
a financial market. The market itself could be an artificial one (i.e., simulated,
like the so-called Minority Game), or a real one – the technique is essentially
the same. The method we presented provides a significant extension of pre-
vious work [6]. When coupled with an underlying market model that better
suits the time-series under analysis, these techniques could provide useful in-
sight into the composition of multi-trader populations across a wide range of
markets. We have also provided a framework for dealing with markets con-
taining a very large number of active agents. Together, these ideas can yield
superior prediction estimates of a real financial time-series.
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